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Two-sided markets

Concept · Markets

Two-sided markets

Why a platform’s price for one group is really a decision about another

Price one side, and you have priced both.

On June 25, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in Ohio v. American Express that a credit-card network cannot be judged by looking at only one side of it. The government and several states had sued Amex over rules that stop merchants from steering shoppers to cheaper cards. They offered evidence that Amex raised its merchant fee by an average of 0.09% of the purchase price between 2005 and 2010, and that the increase was not entirely spent on cardholder rewards.

In one sentence

A two-sided market is one where a platform connects two distinct groups that each value the other’s participation, so how the platform splits its prices between the groups matters as much as how much it charges in total.

The ruling turned on what kind of market a card network is. A transaction platform cannot make a sale to one side without simultaneously making a sale to the other: a card that no merchant accepts is worthless to the cardholder, and a merchant network that no cardholder carries is worthless to the merchant. Economists call the resulting dependence an indirect network effect. It is why a fee on merchants and a reward for cardholders are one pricing decision, not two. The dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, reached the opposite result and argued that the plaintiffs had shown harm to merchants.

Not every business with two customer groups qualifies. The Court contrasted newspapers, where advertisers value readers but readers are largely indifferent to how many ads there are. Because the effect runs in one direction, it said, newspaper advertising behaves much like a one-sided market. The test is whether each group’s participation raises the value of the platform to the other.

Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole’s 2003 paper gave the field its central claim. When two groups depend on each other, the platform chooses a price structure, meaning who pays and how much each side pays, and that structure is not neutral. Video game platforms such as Sony, Sega and Nintendo, they wrote, make money from game developers through per-unit royalties and fixed fees for development kits, and treat gamers as a loss leader. PC and handheld operating systems, by contrast, aim to make money from consumers.

Forms of two-sided markets

Platforms differ in how the two sides interact, and that interaction determines how strongly each side pulls on the other.

Transaction platform

The platform sells a single transaction that both sides consume at once. A credit-card payment needs a cardholder and a merchant in the same instant, which is why the Supreme Court analyzed Amex as one market.

01
The platform sells a single transaction that both sides consume at once. A credit-card payment needs a cardholder and a merchant in the same instant, which is why the Supreme Court analyzed Amex as one market.
Audience and advertiser

One group receives content and another pays to reach it. The pull is often lopsided: the Court noted that newspaper readers barely care about ad volume, so the effect runs one way.

02
Complementor platform

A core product needs outside developers or producers, and they need users. Game consoles court developers and subsidize gamers, while PC operating systems have typically charged consumers.

03

A continuum, not a switch

Cross-side effects range from weak to overwhelming. A newspaper sits near the weak end, because readers barely notice ads. A card network sits near the strong end, because no sale happens unless both sides agree at the same moment.

LowSides can transact without much coordinationHighEach side’s value depends on the other’s participation
“Match two sides that need each other.”
— Execemy

Why it matters

The split of prices is a strategic choice with measurable effects. Rochet and Tirole observed that platforms often treat one side as a profit center and the other as a loss leader, or at best as financially neutral. Airbnb changed its split in 2025 and 2026. Hosts had generally paid about 3% of the booking subtotal and guests a separate 14.1% to 16.5% service fee. Airbnb is moving all U.S. hosts to a single 15.5% host fee with no separate guest fee, saying it wants clearer upfront prices for guests, which it believes could help drive demand and benefit hosts.

The change shows why the split is not neutral. The whole fee now sits with hosts, who can respond by changing their listed prices. When Airbnb moved an earlier cohort of hosts, AirDNA found that about 30% raised prices enough to offset the higher fee fully and another 30% offset it partly. The platform’s choice moved the burden, and the hosts’ response determined who paid.

Cross-subsidy also makes one-sided readings of a business misleading. Judged from the merchant’s side alone, Amex looks expensive. Judged as a whole, the merchant fee pays for rewards that make cardholders choose and use the card, which is the reason merchants accept it. The Supreme Court’s holding turned on that point.

Finally, a platform lives or dies on whether both sides show up.

Real-world examples

The same concept shows up in different ways across industries.

When it breaks

Platforms break when one side never reaches the level the other side needs. Windows Phone is the documented case. In October 2017 Belfiore described the loop from the inside: developers would not invest because there were too few users, and Microsoft’s payments and its own apps did not change that. The press release does not blame the app gap, so the write-down proves the business failed but not the mechanism. Belfiore’s tweet supplies the mechanism.

Repricing can misfire even when the logic is sound. Airbnb’s single fee is meant to make prices clearer to guests, and its own view is that clearer pricing helps demand. One host told CNBC he had raised his listed prices to keep guests’ total roughly the same and was seeing a slowdown in bookings, though he suspected the market had yet to settle. CNBC also reported host complaints and some hosts considering leaving. This is one host and a few forum complaints, not a measured effect. The outcome depends on whether hosts’ higher listed prices cost the platform bookings.

The label itself can be misused. Two-sided markets analysis was decisive in Ohio v. American Express, and four justices concluded that the plaintiffs had shown harm to merchants anyway. Newspapers, the Court said, do not qualify.

Key takeaways

  1. 01

    If participation rises on one side, does activity or value rise for the other? Measure that cross-side response before calling the business two-sided.

  2. 02

    Which side should pay, and what behavior do you expect from a price or subsidy change? Compare total transactions and contribution across both sides.

  3. 03

    When a fee moves between sides, do listed prices, participation or usage change? Track pass-through and who ultimately bears the cost.

Sources

  1. Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. ___ (2018), No. 16-1454 · Supreme Court of the United States, 2018-06-25. Opinion of the Court, Part II (transaction platforms; newspaper contrast); footnote 2 (0.09% increase, 2005–2010); Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan
  2. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets · Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2003-06. Abstract and Section 1 (price structure; video game platforms versus PC operating systems)
  3. Airbnb’s new fee change frustrates hosts—what to know before renting out your home · CNBC Make It, 2026-08-22. Old fee structure (3% host, 14.1%–16.5% guest); new single 15.5% host fee; September 15 deadline; AirDNA analysis (30% fully offset, 30% partially); host comments; Airbnb’s stated rationale
  4. Microsoft’s Joe Belfiore says Windows 10 Mobile features and hardware are not the focus anymore · Windows Central, 2017-10-08. Embedded tweet by Joe Belfiore, October 8, 2017
  5. Microsoft Announces Restructuring of Phone Hardware Business (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) · Microsoft Corp., via U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015-07-08. Impairment charge of approximately $7.6 billion;